THEOLOGY

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Editorial

The Social Dynamic in American Christendom - *C. D. Kean*

Christianity and the Secular Myths - - *Charles Smyth*

Clerical Study Circles - - - - - *A. C. Scupholme*

Mandell Creighton - - - - *Montgomery Belgion*

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THEOLOGY

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Editorial

The Purpose and Scope of Clergy Training: an Outline of Current Practice, published for the Central Advisory Council of Training for the Ministry,[1] says all the right things about pre-ordination and post-ordination training, even if it does so without much distinction and without any sparkle. It is obligatory reading for all who have to do with the training of the clergy.

It is no doubt refreshing to read a document of this kind in which the word "crisis" does not occur. Its absence is not a sign of complacency, but the booklet does not betray much alarm about the uncertainty of the world and the insecurity of the Church in which those to be ordained will have to do their work. Clergymen trained according to the pattern it outlines should be devout, good, earnest, fairly well-informed, modest, and staid. The need for experimentation of one kind or another is now and again remarked upon, though without much emphasis or convincing force. It would be strange if the training here envisaged were to impel a man to do anything outrageous or to think dangerous thoughts.

We do not ask for the words "vision" and "adventure" any more than "crisis" to be placarded before our eyes. But if this document adequately represents the presuppositions of the training of its ministers which the Church of England designs to supply, it is perhaps unlikely that much change in its constitution or ethos is to be apprehended. These clergymen will not make big mistakes, or throw spanners into the works. We can hardly expect that they should be trained to do so, but a training that might produce those results along with others that would compensate for them might be apt to these times.

The booklet says all the right things, but it is much stronger in its outline of training in prayer and in theology than in giving substance to the need for understanding the facts about contemporary society. Priests cannot be expected to be expert social scientists, but they need to be equipped with means of absorbing the results of expert inquiry. Moreover, they need to learn how to gain insight into, and sympathy with, the day to day decisions in terms of which laymen have to work out their obedience to God and their service of the neighbour. The booklet may be held to say this, but the importance of this aspect of ministerial training seems to be insufficiently realized, and too little thought to have been given to its implications. The question whether a radically new kind of training is needed, at least for some clergy, such as the Mission de France is attempting at Lisieux, is not even considered.

[1] Press and Publications Board. 1s. 6d.

We may observe, by the way, that ordinands or the newly ordained are nowhere advised to read regularly any theological periodical. Did the compilers suppose that the advice is so obvious that it is everywhere spontaneously followed? It may be obvious, but it is not very widely followed. Or do they consider that at present there are no periodicals which clergymen can wisely be urged to read? If so they should have lamented this fact and have called attention to a crying need.

This booklet is not concerned with the recruitment and selection of candidates for the ministry. It leaves us wondering, however, whether in addition to the clergy who are to be trained in the manner here outlined, C.A.C.T.M. is contemplating experiments in the training of a voluntary, supplementary, or local clergy, whether deacons or priests. Without such a provision we do not see how the ministry of the word and sacraments is to be sustained all over the country. The difficulties of combining two types of clergy are obvious, and how to devise a sufficient training for the voluntaries would not be the least. But is it not possible that a scheme of training might be discovered by which in many parishes a layman with local roots and engagements could be prepared, after due probation, for ordination? If there are insuperable objections to such a provision, let them be explained. The idea has been unofficially canvassed for a considerable time. If it is impossible of realization, then the clergy now being trained should be warned that their lines are likely to become continually thinner and compliance with the admirable precepts here proposed increasingly difficult.

Much depends on whether the Church of England intends to try to maintain the parochial system in its traditional form. We could do with a comprehensive study of the idea of "the parish," viewed theologically, historically, sociologically, and realistically. A lively discussion of this subject is proceeding on the Continent. *Les Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales* (*No. 4, Juillet-Août, 1949*)[1] provides a useful guide to the literature that has already appeared.

[1] Abbaye du Mont César, Louvain.

American Letter: No. 4

THE SOCIAL DYNAMIC IN AMERICAN CHRISTENDOM

American Christianity has tended traditionally to express itself in an activist form. The particular focus of action has varied from generation to generation and from community to community, but the tradition has put its stamp in one way or another on almost the whole of American church life.

At one end of the Christian spectrum, the Society of Friends has expressed the driving motivation of the "inner light" through developing preparatory schools in the last century, and through projects for national and international reconciliation and relief. Probably more Americans know of the American Friends Service Committee, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize a year or two ago, than have any appreciation of what the Quakers stand for.

At the other end of the Christian spectrum, the Roman Catholic Church has likewise adjusted itself to the American scene in an activist manner. Its school and university program is completely involved in the kind of athletics that have become somewhat of a liability to higher education in this country, and in the case of the Romans it has seemed that their emphasis has been even greater than that of the great State universities. The national Catholic Welfare Conference, the central administrative organ of the denomination, sponsors social welfare programs, medical programs, educational conferences, and the like, and is vitally interested in social legislation.

The same general observation could be made of every major group in this country. The largest non-Roman communion, the Methodists, have traditionally regarded the promotion of temperance in the country nationally as the specific social program of their Church. All of the well-organized non-Roman churches, including the Episcopalian, have made a parish-house program of clubs, organizations, and classes the natural supplement to Sunday worship, particularly in the city parishes. They have also been directly or indirectly involved in sponsoring community social work programs of one kind or another, and likewise have created and supported hospitals, clinics, and convalescent homes and orphanages as part of their regular denominational programs in local areas. While the degree of scientific awareness has varied from situation to situation, and the modernity of programs has certainly been unequal, nevertheless, social good works have been generally associated with American Protestantism, particularly since the turn of the century.

One of the results of the activist tradition has been the existence of a serious hiatus between theology and action up until fairly recently. While the observation is certainly a generalization from which exceptions can be pointed out, it is nevertheless a pretty fair description of the prevailing climate. Regardless of differences in

theological emphasis, American churches have tended to expres themselves in programs which were remarkably alike in their psycho logical and ethical presuppositions and objectives. It has been take for granted that the role of the Christian Church in history is t improve individuals and society.

An excellent example of this attitude is that of the Social Gospe movement which flourished in the United States from around th turn of the century and the force of which is still far from spen Associated historically with the names of Washington Gladden an Walter Rauschenbusch, the Social Gospel sought to apply the ethi of Jesus directly to social situations as the means of solving historica problems. The Social Gospel movement affected the whole of non Roman Christianity in America, and indirectly the Roman Church as well, by turning its attention to some extent to programs designe to improve society. Of course, the group who carried the flag was tiny minority, and there has been large and vocal opposition durin the past half-century, but the problem has concerned particula objectives much more than it has the ethical drive. While there hav been many who used to say the Church has no concern with socia problems, they never really meant it—what they did mean was tha the Church's ethical drive should be in other directions than thos which affect individual or class interests.

Whatever American Christendom has claimed to be theoreticall —and this has, of course, varied from group to group—its socia theology has until recently been one of implicit Unitarianism. Th Roman Catholics are tarred with the same brush as the rest of th Christian world, with the exception of the Quakers, whose awarenes of a specific frame of reference, while different from other Christians was consistent with what they did socially.

By implicit Unitarianism is meant the assumption that man, indi vidually and socially, is capable of resolving his problems withi history, largely through some kind of ethical improvement. In detai this might vary from the attempt to realize certain specific socia goals to an emphasis on individual adjustment to internal and ex ternal pressures, or to the superimposing of some kind of religio ethical system on society. The common denominator in all of thes is the assumption that the real effect of Christianity is in terms o ethical motivation and in standards by which individuals and group may be appraised.

The Episcopalians have been part of the general pattern. To b sure, the distinctive Anglican emphasis upon the centrality of th Church has made some difference in the way the social question have been approached. There has been a considerable emphasis o the Eucharist as the keynote to social action, but even this has bee more often than not primarily ethical in significance and theologic ally Unitarian in spite of its terminology. The primary agency o the Episcopal Church in the field of social awareness, the Churc League for Industrial Democracy (now the Episcopal League fo Social Action), has always been dominated by activist program rather than by theological awareness of the significance of issue

National and Diocesan departments of Christian Social Relations have issued pamphlets for study, but again their weight has been almost exclusively in the direction of programs to ameliorate situations. What those interested have taken to be theology has actually been a rationalization of social ethics, either in particular or in general or both, rather than an interpretation of the fundamental meaning of man's social predicament.

Regardless of the lip-service given in Scripture readings, ancient liturgical forms and hymns, the programs and presuppositions of the American churches have until recently shown little evidence of appreciating the central affirmation—Jesus Christ is saviour and redeemer. The American churches have borne little concrete witness to any understanding of the application to their own corporate existence of that statement of St Paul: "The life I live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

The underlying optimism of organized American Christianity as regards the social implementation of the Gospel has been severely shaken by two rather unrelated forces. The first of these is the political role of Russia in the modern world, and the second is the growing influence of various forms of Continental theology, with their concern over crisis, decision, and judgment.

The Russian situation has seriously disturbed the prevailing pattern of the churches' attack upon social questions. Before World War II, Russia was not really a major issue, and one's attitude toward Russia was a kind of general touchstone for political orthodoxy—but that attitude was largely one of tolerance, respect for long-range social objectives, and some use of the dialectic Marxist social criticism. It was not in itself Communist by any means, although there were gradual shadings of sympathy from slightly left of centre to extreme left.

In the late 1930s, there was a strong feeling that the groups which stood for social action within the churches ought to co-ordinate their efforts more completely than they had, and an inter-church social action agency was created—the United Christian Council for Democracy. It is interesting to realize that this agency was no sooner created than it was split wide across denominational lines over the question of Russia. Word War II had begun. First, there was the stage of the so-called "Phoney War," when social action forces divided over support for the Russian position, or support for the Allies against Hitler. The cleavage went to the very bottom of the organized movement for social action within the churches and it has never been overcome since. During the years between the German attack on Russia and VJ Day the rift was glossed over, but the damage was done.

The social action movement within the American churches has been faced with a concrete political test for which it was not really ready. Its own understanding of its own role in history was not profound enough to enable it to meet the test creatively. On the one hand, there has been a small but fairly strong and very vocal group

which has accepted the "Party Line" with only the slightest question; and the former partners of those in this group are hard put to it to understand how the social impact of the Gospel can be consistently related to the shifting policies of the Kremlin. On the other hand, a considerable part of the social action movement has been so frightened by the spectre of Communism as to lose any effectiveness it ever had, and what was once a fairly zealous attack on social evils has quieted down into a vague, general social humanitarianism which is afraid of having any teeth at all. Those who have tried to steer between these two alternatives have been beset by the suspicion of the "party liners" that they were not dependable, and by the fears of the "moderates" that they were Communist.

This issue is not yet clarified in the American churches. Probably no one has done more than Professor John C. Bennett of the Union Theological Seminary to bring order out of chaos on this level, but the work is not done yet. The result has been the practical death of the Church League for Industrial Democracy in the Episcopal Church. Because it demonstrates particularly the political rift in the Christian social action movement of the several churches, it has been able to exert little influence and has undertaken little if any activity since the end of the war. At the present moment a vacuum exists in the Episcopal Church in this area. The National Council and other official agencies are not able to fill it with their projects because these lack any vital social dynamic. Nothing really effective exists now to sharpen the social consciousness of Episcopalians with respect to concrete political and economic action.

The theological awakening has split the social action movement in the opposite direction, causing a serious rift between those with primarily humanitarian motivations and those who have been influenced seriously by the Continental theologians. The old time Social Gospel men regard the theological awakening as a cutting off the nerve of effort. Those who have accepted the newer theological insights suspect their former partners of Utopian illusions and a bland disregard of the facts of human nature.

As a matter of fact, the influence of Karl Barth and Karl Heim is not very great in this country. The theological movement has not really taken the form of a denial of the importance of historical action to any great extent. Neither has there been too great an acceptance of the peculiar kind of flight from history characteristic of Nicolai Berdyaev. Of the Continental theologians, Emil Brunner, with his very practical concern with historical situations, has had the greatest direct influence; but even more influential than Brunner has been a particularly American development of the same general type.

The name of Reinhold Niebuhr stands as the symbol for the theological awakening in the social action movement of the American churches. In a more subtle and perhaps more pervasive sense, the German exile and former Christian Socialist, Paul Tillich, has done a tremendous amount to introduce new categories into the social thinking of American Christians. But Niebuhr is the name to conjure with. Himself a product of the Social Gospel movement, he has

never denied social concern. At the same time as he was preparing his Gifford Lectures, he was the moving spirit in the United Christian Council for Democracy. Those who have been closely associated with him call themselves the Fellowship of Socialist Christians, that is until a year ago, and now are styled the Frontier Fellowship. Niebuhr himself is one of the leaders of the post-"New Deal" movement—Americans for Democratic Action.

The unique contribution of Niebuhr to the social action movement has been the introduction of the categories of judgment and redemption into Christian social analysis, not denying a limited validity to the Marxist categories, but placing them in a more profound perspective. Historical developments are seen against the background of an understanding of history, which regards all human movements as divided inwardly—between genuine creativity and a destructive *hybris*. To the extent that those participating in such a social movement are aware of their predicament, to that extent its demonic character is mitigated; but to the extent they ignore it, their ambiguity is heightened. The specifically Christian dynamic is realized not in institutions as such, nor in religious formulas as such, but in that faith which enables men and women to participate in the immediate, yet to transcend their involvement, through the Lord.

One can hardly do justice to Niebuhr's tremendous accomplishments in a brief paragraph, but the foregoing is accurate so far as it goes. It certainly represents a tremendous departure from the traditional humanitarian activism which has for long marked American Christianity. It can easily be seen how it can arouse the greatest suspicion and hostility in those who feel that their motives are questioned by others who appear to be limiting their own commitments. On the other hand, it can also be recognized how those who see life's problems from such a perspective are troubled by the bland optimism of the traditional social liberals who so often fail to recognize their own demonic potentialities. Certainly, in an age of world upheaval—on the moral as well as on the political level—such a point of view represents a peculiarly potent challenge, after an era when humanitarianism has dreamed so much and accomplished so little.

In the Episcopal Church, the social action movement is split theologically as profoundly as it is divided by political loyalties, and the diversions are not parallel but cross-cut. A good many of those who are very far to the left recognize the pertinence of the theological awakening. Niebuhr himself has been an outstanding critic of Russian pretensions, but not all those who share his theological categories follow his political line.

There is a growing awareness in the seminaries of the Episcopal Church that the Church's social impact must be more than an attempt to apply the "ethic of Jesus" to an acquisitive society. The influence of Niebuhr, Tillich, and others has been most pronounced in the seminary faculties, and as a result there has been a greater sense of correlation between the theological studies of the students and their awareness of their historical predicament than has been

true for many generations. To the extent that this influence is felt, to that extent the "ivory tower" tradition is destroyed, without the students having to pay the price of living with a two-dimensional pragmatism as their working philosophy. The Christian heritage is recognized as providing a more profound and incisive analysis of the particular social situation than anything else, and to come into its own when it is used for such purposes.

But again, the rift continues, and the future is far from clear. At the moment, therefore, the social action movement is paralyzed as much by a divided soul as by divided political interests. This is perhaps less true in the Episcopal Church than in some other churches, but the spiritual paralysis is sufficiently real to prevent any co-ordinated attack on the problems of the day. The accuracy of the statement can be demonstrated by the reading of *Christianity Takes a Stand*, the Penguin book edited by Bishop Scarlett of Missouri three years ago, on behalf of the Commission on Social Reconstruction of the Episcopal Church. With all its manifest zeal for social justice in the world, here was depicted a divided soul in a divided body.

The social dynamic in American Christendom is undergoing a transition. As it emerges from the present trials it is certain to be marked by a far greater political realism than it has ever known before, and by a far more profound grasp of theological categories. But it cannot be said at the present what shape the movement will take as it crystallizes again into a going force.

CHARLES D. KEAN.

Christianity and the Secular Myths[1]

INTELLECTUALLY the cleverest, if morally perhaps the most contemptible, of modern tyrants, Benito Mussolini has left his mark, not so much on history as upon the way in which men think about history, by harnessing to the juggernaut of power politics Sorel's conception of the Myth. That word, however, is one with which we are so familiar in an entirely different context, as denoting a legend, a fable, or a downright fraud, that English readers found it difficult to adjust their minds, for example, to the title of such a book as Alfred Rosenberg's *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (*Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts*: 1930), and to receive that title in the sense in which it was intended by its author. A "myth" in this sense may perhaps be described as an interpretation of history, or an interpretative pattern imposed, often quite arbitrarily, upon the course of history, past, present, and to come, and of which the real point is not so much that it explains the past as that it determines

[1] A sermon preached in St Margaret's, Westminster, on May 29, 1949, being the Sunday after Ascension Day, and also the concluding Sunday of the Mission to London: from the text, ". . . and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." (1 John v, 4.)

the future. It is not analytical: it is dynamic. It is the creation of sentiment rather than of reason: and it appeals not to the intellect, but to the will. It is "not so much knowledge as affirmation" (Rosenberg). There is no point in asking whether it is true or untrue: if it can find a sufficient number of people to believe in it, and to act on their belief in it, it will be made to come true, and therefore to be true, by their enactment of it: for its specific function is to supply the emotional and volitional drive that gives a group cohesion and enables it to put its energies into play. "We have created our myth," declared Mussolini at Naples in 1922. "The myth is a faith, it is passion. It is not necessary that it shall be a reality. It *is* a reality by the fact that it is a goad, a hope, a faith, that it is courage. Our myth is the nation, our myth is the greatness of the nation."[1] The myth, then, in this sense is a kind of belief about history: but the really important thing about it is that it is a belief that gets things done.

Here Mussolini was indebted to Georges Sorel, who, in his *Réflexions sur la Violence* (1903), observed that myths—using the word in the sense of a body of mental images capable of evoking sentiment instinctively—have been a great force in history, and that all great social movements (Christianity, for example) have taken place in the pursuit of a myth. The Syndicalist myth, which Sorel himself proposed for the energising of the proletariat, was the General Strike. The Fascist myth, as we have already seen, was the greatness of the Italian nation. The Nazi myth was the supremacy of the Aryan race. The Communist myth is the classless society. All these various myths, whether they derive their peculiar character from history, biology, or economics, have two elements in common: they are prophetic, and they are dynamic: they are designed to realise the future they predict by making the group to which they are addressed accept the prediction as a present reality. To borrow a phrase of Professor Dodd which has recently enjoyed a formidable vogue among the theological public, the myth is a kind of Realised Eschatology.

But what has all this to do with Ascension Day, the Feast of the Enthronement of Christ the King? Perhaps a quotation from Max Beloff's *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia* (vol. ii: 1936-41) will sufficiently explain. Mr Beloff writes: "The basic and inescapable relation of the Soviet State to other States is one of conflict. And for a full understanding of the Soviet attitude, it is necessary to realise that the conflict is one in which the outcome is a fore-ordained victory for the Soviet State and, with it, the international proletariat. To try to comprehend the Soviet outlook and to dismiss the inevitability of the world proletarian revolution is as idle as to try to comprehend the outlook of medieval man and to dismiss the reality of the Last Judgment."[2] In that description, there is one word on which we are bound to pause: it is the epithet "medieval." I do not think

[1] Quoted by George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, p. 759.

[2] I owe this reference to a book review by Edward Crankshaw in the *Observer*, May 15, 1949.

that this is indicative only of the fact that in our modern culture professing Christians are in a numerical minority, although this is obviously true. It also raises the far deeper and more disturbing question: among modern professing Christians, what has become of the emotional and volitional drive of the Christian Myth?

If we analyse the teachings of our Lord, four ideas appear to stand out in high relief: belief in God, the forgiveness of sins, the Kingdom of Heaven, and the Judgment to come. All these are seen to be firmly rooted in, and to be an integral part of, the Christian interpretation of history, which has, or ought to have for us, at least the value that the secular myths of yesterday and to-day have for their votaries. And it is imperative not only that we should know what we believe, but also that we should know what it means to believe it. "What dost thou chiefly learn in these Articles of thy Belief?" inquires the Catechism, and you will remember the answer: "First, I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world. Secondly, in God the Son, who hath redeemed me, and all mankind. Thirdly, in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me, and all the elect people of God." These are the three primary points at which the Creed makes its impact upon the individual, but they are all part of the wider framework of the Christian Myth: Creation, Redemption, Election, Sanctification, Judgment: the establishment of Christ's Kingdom on Calvary, and its consummation at the Doom. The Christian Myth, in which the central and crucial point is the Crucifixion and Resurrection of the Son of God, begins with the Spirit of God moving upon the face of the waters, and culminates in the New Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God. Through it runs the history of God's Chosen People, journeying down the centuries: the pilgrimage, first of the old Israel, the Jews, and then—when they rejected the Messiah—of the New Israel of God, the Church. And it is unthinkable that anyone who believes these things should not be fundamentally a different kind of person from anyone who does not believe them. If our Myth really controlled our outlook and our activities, the Christian should be as clearly differentiated from the non-Christian as the Fascist from the non-Fascist or the Communist from the non-Communist.

You will not misapprehend the sense—the European sense—in which I am here employing the word "Myth." For purposes of comparison, it is at least as permissible to speak of the Christian "myth" as it is to speak of the Totalitarian "gospel," in order to denote those attributes which are common both to revealed and to secular religion. I am not of course suggesting for one moment either that Christianity is what the Englishman means by "a myth," or that the Christian Myth is of the same quality or character as the Myths of the secular religions—Syndicalism, Fascism, Nazism and Communism. Indeed, there are three absolutely crucial points of difference.

In the first place, the myths of the secular religions are secular myths: they are confined within the framework of this world and of this æon and of what we call history: whereas the myth of Chris-

tianity transcends this framework, taking its origin before history began, and finding its consummation when history shall have ceased to be: its setting is not in time, nor even in time produced indefinitely in an immeasurable succession of perishable moments, but in eternity: it is not only historic, but pre-historic and post-historic; not only natural, but also supernatural; not only this-worldly, but also other-worldly. Hitler's Reich was designed to last for a thousand years: the classless society of Communism, once established, is presupposed to persist indefinitely: but Christ's Kingdom is eternal, everlasting, beyond the end of time.

In the second place, the myths of the secular religions have all avowedly been devised by men and created by men: they are projections of the human mind upon the material of history. But the Christian Myth is not of the will of man, but of God: it brings the material of history, from first to last, under the control of a Divine Purpose that transcends history, not from within but from without: it is, as it were, axiomatic and not deduced: it is what we start from, a *datum* given to men by God, who requires that they shall accept it. Every secular myth is ultimately the projection of man's idea of what he would like to happen. It is the make-believe, the wishful thinking, of power politics. But if the Christian Myth were simply wishful thinking, if it had been invented by Christian men as the expression of the kind of thing that they would like to believe, there are certain features of it that would never have been included (for example, no one of us can look forward with complacency to the prospect of standing before the judgment seat of Christ), as well as other elements that would never have entered into the mind of man had they not been implanted there by revelation (for example, the literal Resurrection of Jesus from the dead).

For, in the third place, the Christian Myth is radically differentiated from the rival myths of the modern as of the ancient world by the fact that it claims to be historically true. For all practical purposes, it does not matter whether a secular myth is true or false, so long as you are prepared to believe in it. For all practical purposes, it matters vitally that the Christian Myth is true, whether you are prepared to believe in it or not. For our religion has its origin neither in general religious experience, nor in some peculiar esoteric mysticism, nor in an idea, a dogma, a sentiment, or a philosophy of history. The Christian Myth is unique in having at the heart of it a particular event, something that actually happened—namely, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection of Him whom we believe to be the Son of God, which took place on a hill outside Jerusalem when Pontius Pilate was Governor of Judæa, and for which evidence can be produced. The secular myths of our own century—including, with certain reservations, Marxist Communism—are mystical and not historical. Sorel himself was frankly materialist or anti-intellectualist, seeing both in nature and in society not intelligence, but blind will.[1] But the Christian Myth presents its credentials not only

[1] Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 717.

to the will, but also to the reason: and it is not simply affirmation, but also knowledge. It is therefore profoundly distrustful of all rhetoric, including religious rhetoric. And it is impatient of man-made formulæ, of false and facile simplifications of what is by its very nature mysterious and complex.

In these three ways the Christian Myth is sharply differentiated from the secular myths by which, in the first half of the twentieth century, it has been successively confronted.

And yet the secular myths are not wholly false. Like the great heresiarchs of the past, their inventors have rescued and revived, if they have at the same time exaggerated and distorted, certain essential truths to which the conventional orthodox piety of our generation has not always given their full value. First, they have insisted that belief determines action, not by a remote control, but immediately and directly. Second, they have enlisted their followers in the tremendous enterprise of mastering the future through collaborating with a superhuman purpose by which already the future is determined, and with a superhuman will to which all private and particular wills must be subordinated to find in its accomplishment their true fruition. Third, and most important, they have opposed to the spurious and ultimately atheistic individualism which has spread like a miasma over our western liberal democratic culture, the ideal of social solidarity. They conceive of men collectively—the class, the race, the nation—and not as self-contained and isolated individuals; of men, not in an artificial and fortuitous juxtaposition to each other, but in a real and organic union. In these three respects, the Totalitarian gospel is a kind of parody of Christianity, and the Totalitarian Party is always and unmistakeably a secular Church.

The Totalitarian gospel has, of course, the vices of its origin. We know that individuality is precious, because it is the gift of God: and it is here that the Totalitarian conception of social solidarity is a menace, precisely because it is secular: denying, explicitly or implicitly, the immortality of the individual soul, it obliterates society in the mass of undifferentiated humanity. We as Christians know that it is upon the individual within the Church that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are bestowed, it is to the individual within the Church that Divine grace is ministered in the sacraments, although —and this is what we are always in danger of forgetting—for his needs, not as an individual, but in a specific social relationship, as a churchman, a husband, a penitent, a priest, a bishop, or a king. It is also true, and memorable, that there is for the Christian no such thing as private prayer apart from or in addition to the prayer of the Church, to which our private prayers are simply our individual contribution.[1]

Individuality, then, is a good, in so far as it presupposes a social context. The members are members of a Body in which by their respective ministries they are both differentiated and united. But the

[1] C. P. Hankey, "Liturgy and Personal Devotion," in *The Parish Communion*, ed. A. G. Hebert, S.S.M. (1937), p. 151.

characteristic individualism of our culture, which we take for granted because it is what we have been brought up in, is a comparatively recent by-product of the Romantic Movement, which runs from the *Confessions* of Rousseau to the works of Dr Sigmund Freud: its dominating motive is self-interest, its distinguishing trait is introspection, its besetting weakness is self-pity (which is the meanest form of pride), and its harvest is most conspicuously reaped in the Divorce Courts. It is a temper of the mind that sees life, not steadily and whole, but from an unnatural angle, and consequently in a false perspective and in false proportions.

Let me illustrate what I mean. Between 1919 and 1929 there was a remarkable crop of war novels which were mainly concerned with the sufferings of humane and sensitive individuals who had been caught up from civilian life into the fighting services. Being useful for the purposes of pacifist propaganda, this class of fiction was greeted eagerly by the reigning literary clique as "the Truth about the War." But that convenient and conventional description was abruptly challenged by Mr Douglas Jerrold in a famous pamphlet entitled *The Lie about the War*, in which he pointed out that, with whatever measure of fidelity these novels might reflect the emotional experience of individuals, they tended not only to ignore the whole issue about which the world was fighting, but also to obscure or to pervert the elemental truth about the War that in modern warfare the fighting unit is not the individual, nor even the section, the company, the battalion, the regiment, or the brigade, but, at the lowest, the division.[1] So also we Christians, who are not immune from the temptation to religious individualism, need to remind ourselves that in the Christian order of society the unit is not the individual, but the family; not the worshipper, but the congregation; not the parish, but the diocese, gathered about the bishop as its father-in-God. Otherwise we also are liable to concern ourselves intensely with every conceivable struggle except the real one, which is between Christ and Belial, between the Church and the World.

It will by now become apparent whither this argument has led us. The Bible knows nothing of a solitary religion. A Mission must always culminate by appealing for what, in the traditional and serious phrase, is called A Decision For Christ: yet not for Christ as a disembodied spirit, but for Christ in His Body, which is the Church, militant, expectant, and triumphant. The Christian Myth, as we have seen, is unlike the secular myths in its appeal to the reason: but, like them, it appeals also to the will. Our faith is the victory that overcomes[2] the world, because action is governed by belief. The Christian must be prepared to sacrifice as much for his belief as the Communist for his: and he also will know the satisfac-

[1] Douglas Jerrold, *The Lie about the War* (Criterion Miscellany, No. 9: 1930), p. 23.

[2] R.V., "hath overcome." Cf. Peake's *Commentary, ad loc.*: "the change of tense may arise from the victory, though in process of being won, being regarded as assured." The resemblance to the secular myths in this particular is eloquent and arresting.

tion of uniting his individual will to a purpose wider, deeper, more fruitful, and more lasting, and yet not wholly other than his own: but to a purpose infinitely more valid than that to which the Communist devotes himself, because it is the purpose of the omniscient, immutable, eternal, almighty will of God who created us, and whose sons we know ourselves to be. The essence of prayer is that it unites us to the Father's will. Therefore the Christian is differentiated from the non-Christian, not primarily by a code of behaviour covering all the unpredictable points of contact on the circumference of his being, but, at the centre of his personality, by the devotion and dedication of the will to God through Jesus Christ our Lord. All conduct that is not dictated by social convention is regulated—so far as it is regulated by any coherent principle whatever—by a loyalty, which always postulates a belief: and we know in whom we have believed, and we know also that He is Lord of each and all. But remember always that the Talmud rightly says that that prayer is not a prayer in which there is no mention of the Kingdom of God.[1]

CHARLES SMYTH.

Clerical Study Circles

OUR Saviour told us that we should love God with all our heart, with all our mind, with all our soul, and with all our strength. His words describe, not a mild affection, but a consuming passion, an infinite and personal love. Now where love is, especially where it reaches the pitch of passion, the thought of the beloved presses in upon the mind and cannot be kept out, and every effort is made to come into the presence of the beloved. Therefore, those who love God seek Him, as Mary Magdalene, pressed by passion, sought even the dead body of the Lord in the garden on the morning of Easter Day. Conversely—and perhaps it is upon the converse that one ought to meditate—no love, no search; no passion, no inquiry about God.

In the worship of the synagogue, our Saviour and His disciples inherited a liturgical tradition which associated the love of God with sacred study. While the affections were fed by the music of the psalms, the mind was enlightened by the oracles of the prophets, the experience of history, and the instructions of proverbs. Services which included the reading and exposition of the Scriptures provided a popular form of sacred study for the whole people of God. Those who taught the people supplemented this public study in various ways. Jesus showed Himself as learned in the Scriptures as any of His opponents. His words and actions betray a constant and thorough study of the Book of God.

Sacred study, therefore, is not just a pursuit of the specialist; it is required of all Christian people as part of their imitation of Christ.

[1] *Prayer and Life*, by the Author of *The Way*: Mowbray, 1937, p. 81.

This conviction was behind the translation of the Bible at the time of the Reformation, and is expressed in all the services of the Church of England, which follow the tradition of the synagogue in aiming at the instruction of the laity when they are assembled for worship. In a Church which has forms of worship of this character, the ministers are inevitably teachers of sacred knowledge, and the forms of ordination quite naturally emphasize the ordained man's obligation of sacred study. The clerical study circle is simply a device to help the ordinary parson to fulfil this obligation. It is, or should be, the Bible Class of the clergy.

An institution so plainly useful could hardly be reduced to the fitful and precarious condition in which we generally find it, unless there were grave hindrances to be overcome. In order to examine some of them at close quarters, let it be supposed that in the rural deanery of Topsyturvy the chapter clerk has sent out the notices for the Study Circle, and that at the sight of them the brethren, as the Scripture says, with one accord begin to make excuse.

Mr A. has a populous town parish and is undoubtedly a busy man. He is a practical soul with not much use for study. He says it is one of those things which he wants to do, but for which he can never find time. If he were in a country parsonage, he would of course be at his books; long mornings in a sunlit study are his picture of rural felicity. But as things are, his mornings are broken up by correspondence, visits to hospitals, people calling to have papers signed, and so forth. His afternoons are a round of weddings and funerals, meetings and committees, and, when he has time for it, parochial visiting. In all this pressure of business he has not only ceased to study his Bible, but even the reading of those portions of it appointed for the daily offices is often crowded out for want of time. To him, anyone who commends clerical study is indeed a voice crying in the wilderness; and the chapter clerk's notice is soon disposed of—in the waste paper basket. If it were possible for Mr A. to divest himself of his teaching office as easily as he takes off his coat when he comes in for the night, he would be the best of clergymen. But if not, if in spite of himself he remains a teacher, a teacher not primarily of practical wisdom and morality but a teacher of the Scriptures, how can his utter absorption in business be squared with his duty?

Some miles away, at the other end of the deanery, there lives a country parson, Mr B. He is not commonly accounted a busy man. With a parish of between three or four hundred souls, his clerical neighbours wonder whether he ever does a week's work; and every table of statistics showing the distribution of clergy in proportion to the population cries aloud for his liquidation. When the notice comes, he is washing up the breakfast things. On this particular morning he rose about six-thirty, swept the kitchen, lit the fire, and prepared breakfast. His wife is unwell. There are two children to get off to school, and a baby to attend to. When he has washed up, he will peel the potatoes, wash and shave, and about four hours from the commencement of his day you will find him at his prayers

in church. It is dinner-time before he knows where he is. His parochial visiting may best be described as slipping in and out between long hours of humble and domestic employment. Everything around him, his garden, his house, his furniture, shows signs of neglect and decay. He is harassed, lonely, and poor. If he goes to the neighbouring market town, it is for necessary shopping, and he must be back as soon as possible to do this or that in order to keep his house going and his family afloat. Struggling along day after day in his poverty, drudgery, and isolation, he has often thought that if he were in a town, where there is electricity, a nursery school for the children, the chance of an occasional meal at a café, the stimulation of company, his affairs would be better. But in the country he is quite forgotten, and he knows there is no hope of a change. After some years of this sort of life, he has fallen a victim to material care, and when he sees the notice of the study circle it seems as irrelevant as an invitation to tea would be to a man in prison.

In the next parish the notice comes to a more cheerful soul who has solved some of the problems of a country parson, after the fashion of Mr Trulliber, by turning peasant. He comes in from cleaning out his pigs, to read the newspaper and examine his post. He sees the notice and decides to attend the study circle. He likes company, even clerical company, now and then, and since the profits of his farm keep a girl in the house—when girls can be kept—he is more at liberty than Mr B. At least, so it seems. But hay-time is approaching, and when the day of the study circle arrives he has had an anxious week, turning his hay and making it up. If it had been raining, he would have been found among his brethren. But the morning is fine and promising. He walks out into the field, thrusts his hand into one or two of the hay-cocks, there is a short, sharp struggle with his conscience, and at two-thirty in the afternoon when he had intended to be elsewhere, he is forking hay beside the half-completed stack, and his only speculation is whether the whole field will be in before dark.

We will not go round the whole deanery, but we will just look in on Mr D. He is a very young man. And because he is not yet encumbered with heavy parochial or domestic cares, he can still follow his natural inclination to read. He has the best library and is very likely the best scholar in the deanery. When the notice comes, he is absorbed in St Augustine, and sometimes dreams of himself as a canon or a dean. Vanity! He is not yet like Mr A., Mr B., or Mr C., but he will become so. Meanwhile, as Montaigne says, by divers means men come to the same end; he decides not to go to the study circle because he considers it is not worth while to meet and converse with men whom he thinks know less than he does. He says he can use his time more profitably with his books at home.

When the study circle assembled, it consisted of the rural dean, who gallantly struggled to keep things going, the chapter clerk who felt it his duty to support him, and two or three of the brethren. We will not say it was not worth while, or that the smallness of their numbers deprived them of their blessing. There were only two on

the road to Emmaus, yet they learnt much. Nor can we well deny that where two or three are gathered together, our Saviour may be in the midst of them. But with the clergy whom we have visited the enemy of man appears to have had some success, and their ministry may be weakened unless they can be persuaded to think again.

A. C. Scupholme.

Why You Should Read It—XVI

LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON

May I first tell why I myself read the *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton* by his widow, Louise Creighton?[1]

Years ago I read for a book which I still hope to write on Erasmus and the Reformation, and of course my reading included Creighton's *History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome 1527*. I have not opened it since, but I recall how luminously it unfolds its intricate, dark, and tortuous story. However, it aroused no pressing interest in its author, and for some time afterwards I was liable to confuse in my mind Creighton's connexion with Carlisle and that of Hastings Rashdall. Only later did two little books also by Creighton come my way. One is the *Wolsey* in the series Twelve English Statesmen, the other the Hulsean Lectures which he preached at Cambridge in 1893-94 and then published as *Persecution and Tolerance*. Both are books I wish I had known earlier, and it was they that made me want to learn about the man who wrote them.

The *Wolsey* was published in 1888. Since then a fashion has arisen to denigrate and belittle Wolsey, and it is evident from the latest volume dealing with the period[2] that this fashion has not yet passed. Wolsey has, so to speak, been trimmed and *pollarded* into a commonplace self-seeker, ruined by inordinate ambition. Creighton, fitting him into no preconception, saw him larger and grander. He saw him in his uniqueness. On the very first page of Creighton's little book the reader meets with the statement that Wolsey laboured primarily for the greatness of England. Indeed, for Creighton, Wolsey stands in sharp contrast to the majority of English statesmen. They, he says, are "generally opportunists or choose to represent themselves as such." But Wolsey, he says, was "probably the greatest political genius that England has ever produced." He was "greater than his achievements," and he is "to be estimated by what he chose to do rather than by what he did."

Whether we are historians, bishops, or politicians, we are bound to measure other men in the light of our delusion about ourselves. By that delusion, however, the author of those words seems, by exception, to have been little guided. They reflect not only a charity which is rare in the biographer, but also what is more rare, an insight into the nature of human greatness. They express a sympathy

[1] Longmans, 2 vols., 1905.

[2] H. Maynard Smith, *Henry VIII and the Reformation* (1948).

with the iron constriction of circumstances and an understanding that the energy of even the most dynamic may fall short of its task. This was in part because the man who penned them could see where the incitements to persecution lie and was tolerant not from weakness but from strength.

Writing in June, 1894, to H. C. Lea, the American historian of the Inquisition, Creighton says of his Hulsean Lectures of the preceding winter:

> My position is that persecution is not necessarily inherent in the conception of a Church, but is inherent in the possession of power. I . . . regard the Church, when vested with coercive power, not as a religious body, but as a branch of secular institutions.

Again, in one of the charges and addresses contained in the volume, *The Church and the Nation*, Creighton points out that we often speak of the Church when we mean officers of the Church, and it is certainly curious how those who hold the Church responsible for a long chain of misdeeds down the ages fail to see that these were in fact the work of churchmen, and that churchmen are not the Church. Given that the Church teaches a doctrine of human corruption, it would indeed be strange if churchmen, being human, were not corrupt. The Church, G. K. Chesterton remarks in his book *The Everlasting Man*, is justified, not because her children do not sin, but because they do.

The need for the virtue of tolerance in each of us remains quite unaffected. In the book, *Persecution and Tolerance*, Creighton sums up the matter in a short paragraph.

> Tolerance [he says] is needful to the individual; for it is the expression of that reverence for others which forms a great part of the lesson which Christ came to teach him. It is the means whereby he learns to curb self-conceit, and submit to the penetrating discipline imposed by Christian love.

There speaks the man who reverenced Wolsey because he had reverence for others. In his view, each of us needs tolerance for the sake of his individual self. In addition, tolerance, and tolerance alone, is adequate to both of two requisites if we have opinions of our own. If we have opinions, we should hold them in respect, and the more definite they are the more we ought to understand how we came by them. That we can only respect our own opinions and understand how they were formed when we are tolerant is made clear in the paragraph which stands immediately before the one I have just quoted. This earlier paragraph reads:

> The tolerant man has decided opinions, but recognizes the process by which he reached them, and keeps before himself the truth that they can only be profitably spread by repeating in the case of others a similar process to that through which he passed himself. He always keeps in view the hope of spreading his own opinions, but he endeavours to do so by producing conviction. He is virtuous, not because he puts his own opinions out of sight, nor because he thinks that other opinions are as good as his own, but because his opinions are so real to him that he would not have any one else hold them with less reality.

Surely, that is the voice of a sanity which can never have been more enviable than it is throughout the world at the present day.

when the gratification of political rancour especially has reached a degree of savagery, hypocrisy, and lunacy which will hold us up to the shame, contempt, and pity of ages to come! It was, then, Creighton's high estimate of Wolsey and his wisdom concerning persecution and tolerance that sent me to his widow's biography of him.

Now, after so much by way of preface, let me turn to that book itself.

I have been considering him as historian and moralist, and, needless to say, there is much in the *Life and Letters* about his teaching of history. There are, for instance, the impressions left by the lectures which he delivered while first Dixie professor of ecclesiastical history at Cambridge. One pupil is quoted as having written:

> Historical characters in his hands never seemed to be in the grip of relentless circumstances, determining them to a course of action perfectly inevitable. He made you see them as men and women swayed not only by considerations of high policy, but by those commoner feelings and passions which influence the action of all human beings.

Mrs Creighton adds:

> He made his hearers see that at all times men were essentially the same; telling them, for instance, that they "must not think that it was so very nice in the Medieval Church, where there were no Dissenters; for if a lot of cats are tied together in one bag, they will bite and scratch one another even more than if they are prowling about in a room."

The biography is the source for Acton's famous dictum: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Acton had reviewed the two volumes of the *History of the Papacy* which appeared in 1887 and which deal with the popes of the Italian Renaissance. He reviewed them in the *English Historical Review*, of which Creighton was editor, and he furiously attacked them. It was apparently the preface in particular that stirred him to indignation. An exchange of letters ensued. Mrs Creighton gives the main portions of both, and it was in his that Acton uttered his dictum. In Creighton's there occurred this passage:

> I remember that in 1880 I met John Bright at dinner: he was very cross, apparently a Cabinet meeting had disagreed with him. Among other things he said, "If the people knew what sort of men statesmen were, they would rise and hang the lot of them." Next day I met a young man who had been talking to Gladstone, who urged him to parliamentary life, saying, "Statesmanship is the noblest way to serve mankind." I am sufficiently of a Hegelian to be able to combine both judgements; but the results of my combination cannot be expressed in the terms of the logic of Aristotle. In studying history the question of the salvability of an archdeacon becomes indefinitely extended to all officials, kings and popes included. What I meant in my offending sentence in my preface was, that any one engaged in great affairs occupied a representative position, which required special consideration. Selfishness, even wrong-doing, for an idea, an institution, the maintenance of an accepted view of the basis of society, does not cease to be wrong-doing; but it is not quite the same as personal wrong-doing: it is more difficult to prove, and it does not equally shock the moral sense of others, or destroy the moral sense of the doer. The acts of men in power are determined by the effective force behind them of which they are the exponents: their morality is almost always lower than the morality of the mass of men; but there is generally a point fixed below which they cannot sink with impunity.

It would be instructive if it would not carry us too far to examine how Creighton, in virtue of holding these views, was a better historian than Burke, John Morley, Acton himself, or even the great Gibbon. I have given the passage, however, for the same reason that I have quoted other utterances of Creighton's—to show that we can have only profit in studying the conduct through life of one who held such principles. Abstract precepts are all very well. It is when they are seen being carried out in the complex contingencies of daily life that they strike home to the heart and acquire practical value. Creighton was not only historian and moralist; the preferment which fell to him made of him also, willy-nilly, a man of affairs. The theorist had ample opportunity thrust upon him of acting as he preached. In his widow's admirable biography he is to be beheld constantly in action.

When, early in 1897, he went to London, he found war in the diocese. Each church had its own form of service. Inured to the present blend of apathy and anarchy in the Church of England, we can hardly conceive the heated feeling and vigorous demonstrations to which the variety gave rise. At the bishop's first confirmation service, in St Mary le Bow, a Mr John Kensit made a disturbance, because the bishop was wearing a mitre. After he had unexpectedly, during another service, met incense being waved at him, a Member of Parliament wrote to him to remonstrate. Sir William Harcourt was conducting ultra-Protestant attacks in the newspapers. The obstreperousness of the evangelicals was matched by the intransigence of the high church party. At St Ethelburga's, Bishopsgate, the curate in charge discontinued reservation of the sacrament at the bishop's desire, but, after undertaking to obey a distinct command from his diocesan, refused to obey the command to admit to communion Mr Kensit, who had carried his disturbances there. A young man in the diocese took to confession against the wishes of his parents, and the result was newspaper correspondence and a speech in the House of Lords attacking bishops. In January, 1899, some resolutions adopted at a meeting in Holborn town hall of 220 incumbents of the ritualist party were published in the *Daily News*, although the meeting had been private. Protestant opinion in the country was deeply stirred. It was decided to have a case for the use of portable lights and for the ceremonial use of incense argued before the Archbishop of Canterbury. The archbishop's decision went against the ritualists, and filled them with dismay, because it seemed to have been grounded in a rigid interpretation of the Act of Uniformity. A letter from Sir William Harcout in *The Times*, welcoming it for that very reason, was said to have been the best means of making disobedience general.

Creighton realized that he must have difficulty in getting the decision accepted. Nevertheless, he had to try. The considerate tone of the circular letter which he addressed to his rural deans was widely appreciated. There was a request by under a score of incumbents for further guidance, but only three wrote to him to say that they could not obey. With these obdurate three he twice attempted discussion

face to face. The attempts failed. That does not matter. The important thing is how he established that they were in the wrong: not by resorting to prosecution nor even by threats, but simply by stating the inescapable facts. To one he wrote (and to come upon the letter would alone be enough, I feel, to make the perusal of the two volumes of the biography worth while):

> My difficulty is to know why, for the sake of such a matter, you should lay aside all considerations of the duty of obedience to ecclesiastical authority, and of the welfare of the general body of the Church of which you are an officer.
>
> I could not conceive that clergymen could be satisfied by answering a request from their bishop by the simple statement that they did not propose to pay any attention to it.

These sentences, I submit, go far beyond the occasion of their inditing. They are of universal application. They unmistakably distinguish right from wrong. Might may sometimes have right on its side, but might is never to be identified with right, and might can never establish right.

For instance, the Allies did not defeat Hitler because Hitler was wrong. They defeated him because they were the stronger. They may have been right. I do not dispute that in the least. But their rightness was not established by their victory. Likewise, an oligarchy at the head of a nation's affairs may believe that the measures which they impose are right, but whether they acquire a national industry for the state or penalize religious worship, it is only in virtue of their power that the measure is accepted. Its imposition upon the nation does not establish its rightness. Right can only be established by clearly propounding the issue and by resort, not to force, but to the sense of fairness in the heart of every man. That was the course taken by the author of the little book on Wolsey and of the little book entitled *Persecution and Tolerance*, when he was confronted with men in the wrong. In common with all other incumbents, the contumacious trio had undertaken to obey their diocesan, and now they refused to honour the undertaking. Had obedience from them been compelled, they might have imagined that they yielded not to right but to force. The bishop, instead, left them without a leg to stand on.

That does not mean that Creighton nursed any illusions. He did not expect that uniformity would be retrieved. "There is no hope of people agreeing," he wrote in the autumn of 1899; "they must learn to agree to differ and live in peace." Since then, save for an occasional brawl, in Kensington or may be in Marylebone, the lesson would seem to have been learned in the diocese of London. Yet I fancy that the situation to-day would hardly have been regarded by Creighton as the triumph of toleration. He would not have seen it as even a defeat for the cogency of persuasion. For him it would have been simply the consequence of a renunciation of faith in that cohesion which, in his eyes, distinguished a Church from a mass of small bodies of people professing themselves Christian and held together by no principle but convenience.

I have dwelt on this particular episode in Creighton's life because

I feel that it strikingly exhibits the effect of his quality of mind on his actions. He was Bishop of London for just under four of the fifty-seven years of his life. To those four years Mrs Creighton allots two-sevenths of her biography. That is not disproportionate. Although throughout his life he was exceptionally active and versatile, the short period during which he lived at Fulham was the most busy and varied of all. But the man to whom his widow raised the enduring monument of her book stands there the same in youth as in maturity. There were in his life a succession of crucial moments. On the eve of his marriage, when it was still uncertain if he could retain his Oxford fellowship as a married man, he had to consider how he should live. When the living of Embleton in Northumberland was offered to him, he had to consider if he should leave Oxford. He had to weigh an offer to be Dixie professor at Cambridge. He had to consider how to launch the *English Historical Review*. When he had determined to write the *History of the Papacy*, he had to settle whether he should first accumulate notes or begin writing at once. The offer of the bishopric of Peterborough gave him mixed eagerness and regret. He was frequently being sought for advice. Whatever the alternatives, there was invariably on his part the same careful weighing of pros and cons, and the same decision according to principle, as in his dealing with the war of ritualists and evangelicals in London.

It is tempting to recall how he settled the strike in the boot and shoe trade at Northampton and Leicester in 1895, while he was Bishop of Peterborough. His reconciling action was carried on entirely behind the scenes, and should give pause to the advocates of open diplomacy who have been stridently vocal since 1919. In that crisis he again behaved in character.

However, if later generations are able to apprehend the fundamental unity of his life, the credit must be entirely his biographer's. "Nobody," Dr Johnson declared one day in 1772—"nobody can write the life of a man but those who have ate and drunk and lived in social intercourse with him." Mrs Creighton's book does not support the assertion. Only an unsatisfactory biography by some one who had not lived with his subject could do that, and then but negatively. But what the *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton* does show is what an excellent biography can be written by one who has lived in long and continuous intimacy with its subject. The many letters from him to her which she does not hesitate to reproduce testify abundantly to the harmony of outlook and ideals which reigned between them. In everything that he undertook he must have known that he had a true helpmeet at his elbow. Mrs Creighton thus possessed both the knowledge and the sympathy required for the success of her undertaking.

But that would have availed little if she had not also been a gifted writer. Her task was to portray the man alive. She accomplishes it in two ways. On the one hand, she draws on her own memories. On the other, whenever she can, and that is frequently, she quotes her husband's words. Letters, speeches, books—all are

enlisted in her service, but especially letters, and Creighton was a prolific correspondent. She concludes with a chapter of his sayings. It is true that she seldom shows him to have been flagrantly in the wrong. His father, according to her description, cannot have been entirely likeable, but if any crabbedness was transmitted to him the piety of the widow implies that it came to be subdued. She is generous with those little touches which make Creighton as endearing after death as he was in life, and in particular describes how little children instinctively took to him.

Poor Lytton Strachey! How superficial in the light of this book becomes his generalization! "Those two fat volumes, with which it is our custom to commemorate the dead . . . are as familiar as the *cortège* of the undertaker, and wear the same air of slow, funereal barbarism." And how groundless his claim to have revivified the art of biography! I am told that J. N. Figgis declared the *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton* to be one of six great biographies in the English language, and while I myself am not much given to sizing books, I feel, after rereading its 900 and more pages, that I understand what he meant.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

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CORRESPONDENCE

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND BELIEF IN A TRANSCENDENT GOD

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Mr McEachran, in his article in the August number of THEOLOGY, seems to me to have been more than a little unfair to the work of Jung. Not only does he ignore completely the explicit support to the truth of this belief which is to be found in Jung's writings, but what he does say about him is so partial a statement of Jung's careful and reasonable views, as to be quite misleading and almost meaningless. I can find no justification in any of Jung's writings that have come under my notice for saying that Jung considers religion to be "nothing more than an important department

of culture in general." It seems to be based on a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of Jung's researches on the collective unconscious and on archetypal patterns of human thought, whose existences are both now generally agreed upon. I cannot trace the exact whereabouts of the remark attributed to Jung to the effect that if religion were abolished to-day the archetypal unconscious would recreate the whole religious fabric to-morrow, but I can imagine that a misunderstanding might lead one to conclude that Jung meant this. What in fact I think he does stress is that the Christian revelation in the incarnation of our Lord does follow very closely the basic patterns of human thought which have been in the mind of man since the world began. This surely strengthens our belief in the objective truth of the revelation. Jung in general is very careful not to overstep the limits of the field in which he is investigating, but he is equally careful that his field shall not be arbitrarily limited by the susceptibilities of others, be they scientists or theologians, and both have attacked him on occasions. Your contributor's remarks about going beyond one's credentials must be borne in mind by theologians and clerics as well as by those to whom he directs them.

I should like to conclude by drawing attention to Jung's positive contribution to a belief in a transcendent deity. This is most clearly expressed in his Terry Lectures (Yale University Press and O.U.P., 1938). In these lectures he is giving his views as a medical psychologist on the relation between psychology and religion. In the introduction he states his position quite clearly when he says: "I approach psychological matters from a scientific and not a philosophical standpoint. Inasmuch as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I am dealing with it from a purely empirical point of view—that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I refrain from any application of metaphysical or philosophical considerations. I do not deny the validity of other considerations, but I cannot claim to be competent to apply them correctly." I will not attempt to summarize the book here, a quotation from the end of the book will serve my purpose better. After relating the case of a neurotic patient who during the course of treatment had a dream of a religious nature, which brought about her cure, Jung goes on to point out that a rationalist might say that he had replaced an honest neurosis by the cheat of a religious belief. In answering this view he says (p. 113): ". . . I must point out that there is no question of belief but of experience. Religious experience is absolute. It is indisputable. You can only say that you have never had such an experience, and your opponent will say, 'Sorry, I have.' And there your discussion will end. No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a source of life, meaning, and beauty, and that has given a new splendour to mankind. He has pistis and peace . . . the thing that cures a neurosis must be as convincing as the neurosis, and since the latter is only too real, the helpful experience must be of equal reality. It must be

a very real illusion if you want to put it pessimistically. But what is the difference between a real illusion and a healing religious experience? It is merely a difference in words . . . and if such experience helps to make your life healthier, more beautiful, more complete, and more satisfactory to yourself and to those you love, you may safely say, 'This was the grace of God.' "

It is easy to play down the importance of this and to say that it applies to all religions, as indeed it does, but Jung is speaking always as a medical psychologist and not as a theologian or Christian apologist, though it is abundantly clear that he has found the Christian faith most efficacious in its curative powers. Archbishop Frederick Temple wrote a good many years ago: "Our theology has been cast in a scholastic mould—*i.e.*, based on logic. We are in need of, and we are gradually being forced into a theology based on psychology. The transition will, I fear, not be without much pain, but nothing can prevent it." If we approach the findings of modern psychology with open-minded humility, the spirit of God will guide us into all truth; if not we may well find ourselves approaching these truths by way of the patient's couch.

I am, Yours, etc.,

ROBIN WATERFIELD.

40, CRAWFORD STREET,
LONDON, W. 1.

SCOUTING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EVANGELISM

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

The Rev. E. H. Levinge in his article on the above subject in your August number holds that the Scout Movement is not a good instrument for evangelism. It does not win young souls for God in Christ. Religion does not occupy enough space in the Manual, nor receive enough attention in the actual "curriculum."

We must recognize, surely, that Lord Baden-Powell when he used the term "religion" was using it in the English sense that Mr Levinge would probably dislike, that of "natural" rather than "dogmatic" religion, and that where he speaks of the Church and attendance at church he is thinking of the Church as teaching God's law rather than as the ark of salvation. If by evangelism we mean bringing boys into the fold of the Catholic Church, it is not likely that Scouting will be a very potent weapon, because it was never intended for that purpose; but if we believe that any agency that teaches God's law is one way of evangelism, then Scouting is by no means to be deprecated, and the existence of many Roman Catholic troops shows that their Church realizes this. There are countries of course, as Mr Levinge points out, where the vagueness of the doctrinal teaching of Scouting has caused it to be misused for positively anti-Christian ends—in fact, for flagrant nationalism; but these pseudo-Scout movements are not, I believe, recognized by the headquarters of the Movement. Then there is the danger he mentions of Scouting be-

coming a "religion in itself"; it may become an over-absorbing hobby, but it is straining language to call it a religion.

Some of these thoughts have been brought to my mind by my having lately been in a small community where I restarted a Scout troop that had lapsed. It does not matter where this community is; it is quite real and a long way off. There would have been no purpose in having a troop there if the object was evangelism in Mr Levinge's sense; the people are all baptized Christians; all those of suitable age are confirmed, and all except a few Roman Catholics are communicant members of our Church. If they had been so taught, I have not the least doubt that all would have been regular penitents. All the boys available for the troop—that is, all the boys in the place—were already regular Sunday School attenders. From the pastoral point of view, therefore, according to Mr Levinge, there could have been no object in having a troop. Yet I remain impenitent, because I believe that there was plenty of evangelism still to be done among them, which a mere intensification of church life could not do. In that small community, where all had been equally thoroughly instructed in the Christian faith, all had precisely similar background, education, and opportunity, then all should logically have need of nothing further to be in an equal state of grace. Alas, if one judge at all by outward things, it was not so. Exactly as in the rest of the world, there were the trustworthy and the unreliable, the honest and the shifty, the provident and the feckless, the continent and the promiscuous. Nothing further could be done by bringing them into the fold of the Church; they were all in it already; in fact, the building would not hold them all. They had the sacramental means of grace and used them. Another line of attack was needed, and Scouting seemed to provide it.

Conditions in England are not quite the same; indeed, parish priests may doubt the very existence of a cure in which every single parishioner is an active member of the Church, but I use the laboratory condition of that ecclesiastical Utopia to show that the English empirical temper has good reason to suppose that even when you have included all your people in the Catholic Church a surprising amount remains to be done to make them all good people, and that you won't do any harm by getting on with making them good people even if you can't have them all in the Church. I know perfectly well that it is heretical to speak of anybody being "good" at all by moral uplift, but I also know that there is common sense in the heresy, and we have not enough room for manœuvre left us in these days to be able to refute it. Is there a sufficient reserve of honesty, earnestness, reliability in our nation to justify us in deprecating the work of any movement that has these ideals? And shall we not cause mere confusion among the ranks of Christians if we attempt to do so? I would not mind betting that a large part of Mr Levinge's own flock, yes, and a large part of any Christian body in this country, not even excluding the Roman Catholics, are semi-Pelagians, hopelessly fogged about the exact relation of good works and justification. Let us thank Heaven for any who are still con-

cerned with good works; there is room for them all. I have no doubt that what Mr Levinge says is correct about the revival of the Brigade Movement, but that has not prevented a considerable increase also in the number of Scouts, in spite of the extreme difficulty in finding Scoutmasters. I should be thankful for the increase of both; they may be parallel aspects of the same desire of many of the youngest generation to belong to some movement with definite principles and standards, rather than the Brigade revival alone being a revolt from nebulous vagueness to doctrinal orthodoxy.

One final point. All priests are aware, as he says, that the great obstacle to preparing modern people for death is their persistent asseveration (*a*) that they will soon be better and (*b*) that they "never done no harm to no one," but I would point out that the massively negative form of the second is hardly the same as the positive Scout law to do good unto all men, which seems somehow to have an almost Scriptural ring.

Yours faithfully,

D. I. LUARD.

[We regret that we cannot make room for other letters that we have received on this subject; one from the chairman of the Religious Panel of the Boy Scouts Association will appear next month.—ED. THEOLOGY.]

NEW TRANSLATION OF THE BIBLE

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I shall be grateful if I may reply to Mr T. S. Eliot's letter about my article on the new translation of the Bible; for he has read into some of my words meanings which they were never intended to bear.

Mr Eliot agrees with my statement that there is much in the A.V. which is unintelligible to people who have not had more than elementary schooling in language and literature, but he infers from this that it is proposed to make the new translation intelligible to "persons of rudimentary education," and he asks for an assurance that the translators are not attempting this impossible task. The translators are of all people the least likely to suppose that the meaning or thought of the Bible can be made easily intelligible to persons of elementary—or, indeed, of any degree of education. My argument was that it should not be made needlessly difficult by being presented in language which is unintelligible to modern English readers of average education. The Bible is, and will always remain, a very difficult book, however excellently it be translated—but a good modern translation can make it a deal less unintelligible than the A.V. makes it. Kemp-Smith's translation does not bring Kant's *Critique* within the grasp of school children, and no one expects it to, as Mr Eliot remarks. I was told recently by a German friend, however, that Kemp-Smith's translation is being increasingly read by Germans, who find it more intelligible than the original!

When I wrote that "the Church's task is not to promote literary appreciation but to proclaim the Word of God," I did not mean that "the Church has *no* responsibility towards the English language" (which is what Mr Eliot says my words "might easily be taken to mean"), for the sufficient reason that if my words did mean this, I should myself be unable to understand their meaning. How can the Church be said to have (or not to have) a responsibility towards the English language? If Mr Eliot means that the Church has a duty to make the best use it can of the resources of the English language for the purpose of communicating its message to men, that is a duty it shares with all who use the English language. If, however, Mr Eliot wishes the Church to commit itself to a critical judgment on the "deterioration of the language," I can only say that if the early Church had assumed the role of linguistic critic, the New Testament would never have been written. Mr Eliot's complaint that the speech of our people is incapable of expressing exact and subtle thought seems to me somewhat defeatist. In any case, was the language of the seventeenth century more adequate to the thought of the Bible?

I am not surprised that my remark about the language of sermons I have listened to in Anglican churches should seem to Mr Eliot to have no relevance. Being myself a member of the Reformed Church, I hold that the sermon is of the *esse* and not merely of the *bene esse* (or of the *male esse*, as Trollope thought) of public worship, and I fail to see why the canons of ecclesiastical propriety should not apply to the preaching as well as to the reading of the Word.

The insuperable objection to every translation is that it is—not the original. But since translations are necessary, and modern translations of the Bible can be helpful, as Mr Eliot has found, surely it is the responsibility of the Church to call upon the best scholarship at its command to make a new translation which it can commend with greater confidence than any of the productions of individual scholars to those who find the language of the A.V. unintelligible.

Yours, etc.,

September 1, 1949. GEORGE S. HENDRY.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. By John Murphy. Manchester University Press. 25s.

When a publisher's "blurb" assures me that a book is indispensable, I almost automatically assume that I shall get on very well without it. Dr Murphy's book starts with this initial disadvantage, yet it may fairly be claimed that any serious student of the origins and history of religions will be ill-advised to try to get on without it; for it is a weighty and important book; it is attractively written; it reveals its author's very great learning and the sanity and balance of his judgment. It is to be highly praised and widely commended.

It may come in for some unfair criticism, however, if its deliberate limitations are not recognized. It is a scientific rather than a religious book. The author makes it plain here and there that he himself is a religious man, but his standpoint and approach are strictly scientific. Curiously enough, I should judge that the great Karl Marx, were he still alive, and the great Karl Barth (*serus in cœlum redeat*) would read it with equal pleasure, the former because it illustrates his thesis of the intimate relation of religion to sociology, and the latter because it might seem to rest upon the theory that the history of religions is the story of man's fumbling search for God. Dr Murphy has attempted what I should call the natural history of religion; he shows how man's religious concepts develop as he passes from the primitive to the tribal stage and thence to the agricultural and finally to the civilized.

It is well that theologians and philosophers should be reminded that religion, as it appears in human history, has a scientific aspect. For instance, there is some relation between cranial measurements and intellectual capacities, between geographical or climatic conditions and the development of thought. Many of Dr Murphy's sections, therefore, are preceded by a valuable paragraph upon "ecology," a science which is concerned with the inter-relations of living organisms and their environment. It is this approach which gives to Dr Murphy's wide survey its distinction and peculiar value to students.

This is by itself an insufficient background from which to approach the study of religion. In itself it suggests that religion is but the product of man's instincts and intelligence. Perhaps naturally a very large proportion of the book is given to the discussion of "primitive" forms of religion, and, very oddly, Christianity finds no place (beyond an occasional reference) in the story, neither Christ nor Christianity being mentioned in the index.

It is always easy to find points for disagreement in a work of this range, and sometimes Dr Murphy seems quietly to correct himself. Many will be surprised to read that "magic is indistinguishable from religion, and religion from magic, among primitive and savage people." I think Raoul Allier should be reconsidered on this point. Of early Aryan religion Dr Murphy says, "we have no means of getting a glimpse into the prehistory of the undivided Indo-European race, in which at the most primitive stage of its culture belief in Mana was all the religion it had." I suspect that evidence offered in later pages is barely consistent with this and indicates spiritual conceptions amongst the undivided Indo-European race which are hardly to be fitted into Dr Murphy's scheme of development. Von Schroeder's immense and massive erudition in this field seems to have been overlooked. The chapter on the religion of the Hebrews is very interesting in its account of Abraham, but singularly defective for later periods.

There may, indeed, be many defects and blemishes, but this is a notable work of learning to be greatly commended provided the reader bear in mind that the author is concerned with the scientific

aspect of religion; he is not concerned with the truth of the ideas with which he deals; he is not concerned with revelation, and he is not concerned with that aspect of human religion which is God's dealing with the souls of men, His making Himself known, His search for man. There are those who think that Jesus Christ is the key to the understanding of all human religion; such people will judge that we have here religion without the key.

Mansfield College, Oxford. Nathaniel Micklem.

The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology. By H. R. McAdoo. Longmans. 12s. 6d.

"Is there a native Anglican moral theology, and if so, how far is it reformed and how much does it owe to scholastic influence?" (p. ix). This is a question that must have exercised everyone who has observed how the Caroline moralists, apparently without any sense of incongruity, alike castigate the schoolmen and freely borrow their arguments and illustrations. In seeking to answer it Dr McAdoo has done a good, solid, useful piece of work, based on extensive, careful, and—if I know the Carolines—often laborious reading. His book is too close-packed, too rich in quotations and references, to please casual readers; but these are qualities which will strongly commend it to those who are working on moral theology and want to know what Anglican divines have said on such topics as natural law, the morality of human acts, conscience and casuistry, sin and repentance. Its full documentation makes it an admirable directory to the Caroline literature; and since it deals not only with men like Sanderson, Taylor and Hall, but with other less well-known authors, most readers will find their horizon extended, as I did, in reading it. It remains to be seen whether Dr McAdoo's analysis of the traditional and reforming strains, and of strengths and weaknesses, in Caroline moral theology will win general acceptance—as he says himself, his work is to a great extent pioneer work—but he demonstrates convincingly that the Carolines, by preferring St Thomas to later writers and by applying the test of Scripture as they understood it, made a distinctive contribution to their science which no Anglican moralist can afford to ignore.

Dr McAdoo maintains that the authors he reviews are in substantial agreement about the scope, purpose and methods of practical divinity; but—and this is a valuable feature of his work—he recognizes divergences where they exist, either commenting on them or at least quoting amply enough to allow us to detect them for ourselves. For instance, he gives a full account of Jeremy Taylor's individual treatment of natural law. At the same time I must confess that this account does not altogether succeed in dispelling the obscurity that, for me at any rate, surrounds Taylor's doctrine. There seem to be traces of the confusion by which "natural" comes to be opposed to "supernatural" instead of to "positive". Moreover, Taylor's insist-

ence that only God's "express declaring" can constitute "law" appears to lead him in the end into the legalism which uses the Sermon on the Mount as a written code. I wish Dr McAdoo had had room to enlarge on this matter of expounding the moral teaching of our Lord.

The last chapter, on the spiritual life, tells the towers of no mean ascetical inheritance. The survey is necessarily brief, but comprehensive enough to prove that further research must be rewarding. It would be interesting, for instance, to know more of the Caroline attitude to mystical theology. Taylor writes somewhat sceptically, bringing his orthodox description of the unitive way down to earth with a dry little "Thus it is said", and continuing:

> But this is a thing not to be discoursed of, but felt: and although, in other sciences, the terms must first be known, and then the rules and conclusions scientifical; here it is otherwise: for first, the whole experience of this must be obtained, before we can so much as know what it is; and the end must be acquired first, the conclusion before the premises.

In this connexion I cannot resist mentioning a striking verbal coincidence I came upon some time ago, but have not been able to follow up. De Besse (*The Science of Prayer*, p. 54) quotes Rodriguez (*Christian Perfection*, Chap. IV) as follows:

> After all, these mysterious analogies, these transformations of the soul, this silence of all the faculties, this annihilation, this immediate union, and all other terms of this nature, what would they express? Can anyone comprehend anything of them? For my own part, I must frankly confess I do not. There is therefore this difference between divine science and other sciences—that in other sciences before you can learn them you must learn their terms, while in this science you cannot understand the terms until you have perfectly understood and mastered the science. In others the theory precedes the practice; in this practice goes before the theory.

There is something here that should be worth investigating.

Two other points. First (p. 32), I am not sure that Sanderson and St Thomas do in fact differ concerning "the lesser evil." Secondly, I would suggest that, contrary to the author's intention, the important chapter (V) on repentance may leave the impression, upon those who do not know the Carolines at first hand, that they made less of absolution than they did. References to Andrewes' sermon *Of the Power of Absolution* would have served to correct the proportions of the picture.

But it would not be right to end on a note of criticism, even of detail; for Dr McAdoo has done moral theology a great service by writing this book.

LINCOLN. G. B. BENTLEY.

ORIGEN'S CONCEPT OF PENANCE. By E. F. Latko. Faculté de Théologie, Université Laval, Quebec. $3.00.

This book by a young American Franciscan, the first full-length work of original scholarship devoted solely to Origen to be pub-

lished in English, might be expected to have considerable importance. Unfortunately its value is greatly reduced by the author's failure to distinguish between Origen's works extant in Greek and translations of them in Latin. It is an established fact, indispensable for Origenistic scholarship, that Rufinus' translations of Origen are to be treated with great caution, because at his best Rufinus gives little more than a paraphrase of the original and at his worst will deliberately alter Origen's meaning. The same is true of Jerome and the unknown translator of the *Commentary on Matthew*, though they are not such flagrant offenders. Far from realizing that Origen's works extant in Greek must be the primary source for all expositions of his thought, Fr Latko in a work of 162 pages prints a Greek word on only twenty-two occasions (and thirteen of these are misprints!), and never anything as long as a Greek sentence, whereas he frequently and largely quotes the Latin of the translations. Nor (except for two faint hints on p. 116 and p. 150, note 29) does he ever suggest that a problem of translation even exists. The result is a disproportionate presentation of Origen's thought in such points as, for instance, the very interesting passage (extant in Greek) in *Comm. on Matthew* XII, xiv, where Origen seems quite unmistakably to limit bishops' powers of absolution by their moral and spiritual state. Latko (pp. 77-79) suggests that in other places Origen takes quite a different view, and he quotes Rufinus' translation of the *Homilies on Leviticus*. But this sort of argument is no use, unless Latko can support it by passages *in Greek*, because Rufinus was quite capable of altering Origen's sense on such a point as this. Again, it is of little use to discuss (as Latko does on p. 116) whether Rufinus wrote *culpa moralis* or *culpa mortalis* in the *Homilies on Leviticus* XV, ii, unless you also show that Rufinus is giving a word for word translation, and suggest what Greek words he is translating. A superficial reader might even derive the impression from this book that Origen wrote most of his works in Latin. Fr Latko indeed would probably have valuable things to tell us if he would examine his sources more carefully, for he has interesting things to say about Origen's solution of the contemporary conflict about "irremissible" sins and whether private penance existed in his day; and the author has obviously read very widely upon the subject. He does not, however, attempt to relate Origen's concept of penance to his theological system as a whole. He says, for instance, nothing about Origen's peculiar theory that all men need another purgation through another baptism after death, characteristic of his conception of the "Eternal Gospel," to be found in such passages as *Homilies on Luke* XIV. I have noted other misprints in Latin, English, and German on pp. xiii, 11 (note 31), 15, 17 (note 53), 20 (note 6), 84 (note 9), 85 (note 10), 88 (two in note 3), 94 (note 24), 99 (note 39), 108 (note 62), 109 (note 65), 119, 120 (note 5), 122 (note 14), 132 (note 6), 138 (note 7), 142 (note 6), 153 (note 45), and 159.

R. P. C. Hanson.

The Queen's College,
Birmingham.

TWO IN ONE FLESH. By E. C. Messenger. Sands and Co. 3 Vols. Vol. I, 6s. Vol. II, 10s. 6d. Vol. III, 6s.

In a comprehensive work on marriage, Dr Messenger steers a middle course between the legalistic and mystical approach to the problems of matrimony. In the first volume, he examines the age-old prejudices which attend this subject. In the third volume, he outlines the practical implications of his main theme—the holiness of marriage. In the second volume—the most important of the trilogy—he illuminates the whole subject of marriage, love, and chastity by examining the underlying theology of sex in creation; "a study of supernature furnishes the clue for many relationships in nature." He is at pains, however, to point out that what may be theologically satisfying to him in his interpretation is not necessarily taught by ecclesiastical authority. The "Nihil Obstat" accorded to the work has merely negative implications and does not extend an official welcome to this particular view of the mysteries of sex.

Dr Messenger examines Scripture and Tradition and finds that here is plain teaching on the divine institution of marriage. Only on rare occasions do Patristic writers with consistency connect the sexual act with original sin, finding the eating of the fruit of the tree in the Garden to be a symbol of mating. In a full-length work, however, a more thorough account of Scriptural teaching on the matter is needed; the author's exegesis appears slight and perfunctory beside the examination, for example, carried out by Dr Otto Piper. But shattering is his exposure of the untheological basis of counsellors such as Dr D. Mace, who calls the union of true lovers outside marriage "a very serious mistake," and the Rev. L. Weatherhead, although they are all on the same side in the fight for Christian marriage.

The author maintains in the traditional order the causes for which matrimony was ordained, but he is firm in his opposition to much of the traditional Roman teaching on chastity. Drawing a distinction between celibacy and chastity, he refuses to call marriage "imperfect chastity." Dr Messenger is, on the other hand, rather too ready to ascribe to Anglicanism the denial of the good things of this life upheld by the extreme reformers. In discussing *tota depravatio*, he overlooks the all-important *quam longissime* of Article IX. Furthermore, he accuses rather puzzlingly the "Revised Book of Common Prayer," meaning presumably the Deposited Book of 1928, of encouraging authorization of artificial birth control.

Of special interest, in the second volume, is the analysis of the sense of shame experienced in connexion with procreation. While emphasizing the importance of shyness as a God-given restraint which forms part of the delicate pattern of the shared life, he would see in the word *pudenda* "things to be reverenced" rather than "things of which to be ashamed." In the Roman Church there has been too much false modesty and too little positive teaching. Emphasis on the holiness of sex, in the manner of St Chrysostom, becomes an important part of preparation for marriage and ought to be given a prominent place in sex education. Such teaching recalls

Archbishop William Temple's well-known dictum that joking abou sexual matters appeared to a Christian rather like joking abou Holy Communion.

These volumes show that the new attitude towards sex, memor ably expounded by Doms in *The Meaning of Marriage*, is becomin more prevalent among Roman Catholic theologians who, until re cently, were fearful of shedding conventions and puritanical in up holding taboos. The author's account of our Lady's virginity an the speculation about the nine months' gestation in her case seem fanciful and remote in an otherwise clear and well-reasoned state ment. Also a somewhat abrupt and horrified reference to homo sexuality mars an important section on aberration.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN. GEORGE SIMMS.

HOLY COMMUNION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. By R. R. Osborn Lutterworth Press. 8s. 6d.

The Prayer Book celebrations of recent months have brought u once more the question of Prayer Book revision. Mr Osborn hold that no major revision of the Holy Communion service ought to b attempted. Minor revisions, such as modernization, simplification, o the removal of inaccuracies, he is prepared to welcome, but h challenges the claim "that certain elements belonging to primitive or Catholic, worship which were removed in the sixteenth centur for reasons no longer valid in the twentieth, should now be restored by a major revision of the liturgy. For he holds that the rites o 1549 and 1928 are both less "primitive" than that of 1552. What i needed is not revision, but the putting into practice of Cranmer' liturgical principles, which have never been fully implemented Thus, when Cranmer turned the Mass into the Communion he di so in the faith that, in the course of time and by the spiritual edu cation of the people, its privileges would eventually be available fo all—not merely for the devout—and he taught that we should com municate worthily, often, and all together. His concern was for "al my countrymen of England."

This is an interesting approach to Cranmer's eucharistic teachin and liturgical reforms, though many will dissent from it. In the firs part of his book Mr Osborn examines Cranmer's eucharistic teach ing in detail before passing on to a consideration of his expressio of it in his liturgies. He believes that Cranmer was consistent i maintaining a "true presence" of Christ in the Sacrament, as op posed to the papist doctrine of the "real" (*i.e.*, for Cranmer, "carnal" presence. He rightly points out that the change effected in th bread and wine "by use, not in substance, makes everything depen upon the right use of the Sacrament."

The author traverses familiar ground in discussing the liturgica changes made in 1549 and 1552, but his observations are alway stimulating if they do not always command agreement. In my vie his conclusion is certainly sound: "Whereas in 1549 no Sacrament

arian could read Sacramentarianism into the liturgy, according to Hooper, now no believer in Transubstantiation could find that doctrine in the 1552 book. But just as it had never been the intention of Cranmer that people should find Transubstantiation in the old rite, no more was it his desire that they should find Memorialism in the new" (p. 89).

It is most regrettable that Mr Osborn is sometimes inaccurate in his quotations from Cranmer. The subject is difficult enough without this added trial. But his exposition of the 1552 rite is valuable as a contribution to current discussion, and even though he has perhaps read more into it than is actually there, he has said many things that needed saying. His book is never partisan, often stimulating, and always devout.

Manchester University. C. W. Dugmore.

John Lilburne the Leveller. By M. A. Gibb. Lindsay Drummond. 18s.

I warmly commend this account of the life of John Lilburne as a most workmanlike historical study of one element in the complexity of the life of the seventeenth century. The merit of the study is that it gives the evidence on which to form one's own judgment of the importance of Lilburne, and that the author's own judgment does not impede an independent judgment.

Lilburne was a man of very great ability, who defended pertinaciously and with considerable legalistic learning and dialectic the liberty of the small trader. From this angle Cromwell's policy was many times open to considerable criticism. Lilburne had great courage, ruthless fidelity to principle, the power of arousing great popular devotion, and the ability to hold the affections of his wife no matter what unnecessary trials he put upon her.

What Miss Gibb wants to teach through the book is summarized in the following paragraph. "Winstanley, unlike Lilburne, was fundamentally concerned with the economic order as related to political organization. Winstanley stood for collectivism, Lilburne for individualism. Winstanley was a precursor of the modern socialist, Lilburne of the modern democrat. The bitter opposition which arose between the Levellers and the 'True Levellers' (as the Diggers became known) is reflected in modern times by the difference between the socialist-communist and the liberal democrat, a process which is at present in process of being bridged by political developments rather than by ideological synthesis. Their relationship is part of the history of the future, and on its harmonious developments, it may well be, there hangs the fate of the modern world."

What is interesting about the perspective of this study is the attempt from a point of view sympathetic with medieval Christianity to discredit the achievement of the Parliamentarians by praising their left-wing opponents. For my part, Miss Gibb leaves me unconvinced. I must complain that the passing sketch of Luther

and Calvin misrepresents them. Luther had a doctrine of the state which deserves respect, and it is no good suggesting that Calvin had so nasty a doctrine that only the strongest economic motives could persuade anyone to accept it.

But the real question is Lilburne. Of course it is quite right to be clear that Lilburne's concern was with the freedom and right of every citizen and not with economic justice; but I do not see how we can escape the conclusion that he was the kind of man who in any society is a pestiferous nuisance. What is remarkable is not that at times he was treated with less than strict legality, but the amount of patience and forbearance that was shown to him. The ultimate service to posterity in opening up the discussion of a wider outlook on liberty and responsibility (which is a real one) cannot be much in the mind of practical politicians who have to deal with a man who will be content with nothing less than the millennium immediately. Miss Gibb is very concerned to exhibit him as the champion of modern democracy in an age which was too selfish to listen. But if she met this type of person to-day, would she like him? I think not. But the strength and weakness of the Leveller movement in the person of Lilburne is set out fairly in this book for anyone to judge.

BRADFORD. H. CUNLIFFE-JONES.

ISLAM IN THE SUDAN. By J. Spencer Trimingham. Oxford University Press. 21s.

The author of what is the first of a series of monographs on Islam in Africa (south of the Mediterranean fringe) has been Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in the Northern Sudan for several years. The present reviewer read the earlier drafts of *Islam in the Sudan* in the house at Omdurman overlooking the Nile where the book was written.

The importance of the Sudan (Land of the Blacks) in itself and in relation to the larger part of the continent can hardly be exaggerated. There is its political connexion with Great Britain and Egypt as a "condominium"; more vital still is the fact that it is the place where Islam and Christianity meet—where providentially they may be given the opportunity to reconsider their mutual contacts—sadly damaged these recent years in the Near East. Will Islam find the "black" interpretation of an "uneclipsed" Christianity more understandable than the "white"? How far, too, has Africa already caused some transformation in Islam? What has been the influence of animism? Will the Sudan look northwards for its future development, or eastwards towards the Arabia which first gave it Islam? Or will it decide to be an integral part of the great continent—as its name implies might be the case? Will North and South take different points of view here?

This is a book for those concerned alike with the religious and political future of much of Africa. The "solidarity of Islam" will be

reinforced in these pages, while the Sudan has made its own the "tribal system" of the Arabs. The Hamite has become Semitic. Not the least interesting chapters are those dealing with the rise and fall of the Christian kingdoms prior to the coming of the Arabs and the consequent rule of Islamic powers. This ended with the upsurge of Mahdism, and the reader will find a fair and interesting estimate of the Mahdi, discovering that the destruction of his tomb did not solve the problem. Religious interests enter very deeply into the life of the Sudanese. The eschatological elements in Mahdism are by no means quiescent. The widespread influences of the religious orders, with the concomitant of saint-worship, are more than weekly features of life. Sufism has struck out on its own path in the Sudan. 'Abd al-Qādir from Baghdad, ash-Shadhili from Tunis, and al-Mirghani of Sherifian origin have all made themselves at home in the Sudan. Sufism has meant an outlet to the Sudanese Muslim.

There are few matters untouched in the opening chapter on the people who dwell in the land, which should be read in conjunction with that dealing with Islam in the South, where paganism has not made its peace with Islam as in the North. Arabic is to be the *lingua franca* in the North, but English in the South, where the languages are numerous. The concluding chapter on the influence of Westernism is corrective as well as informatory. The *effendiyya* are a tendency not a class. The *effendi* needs more sympathy than he usually gets, as so much depends on him. "The root of the problem . . . is that of keeping all that is basically consistent with the life of a people who must remain agricultural and yet filling them with something new and vital." This must have time and planning. Like other parts of Africa girls' education has leeway to make up. The "dislocation" that has (perhaps unavoidably) been the lot of the Sudan since Gordon needs sympathy and patience not only from the contracting parties to the "condominium" but from the unofficial well-wishers of the African.

Bromley. Eric F. F. Bishop.

SHORTER NOTICES

Psychology for Ministers and Social Workers. By A. Guntrip. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

The author claims that his work is "an 'appetizer' designed to give to ministers of religion and social workers a taste for psychology, and some idea of its possibilities in relation to their work." It may be doubted whether it is calculated to achieve this aim. It would be more likely to benefit somebody who already possessed some knowledge of the subject. A beginner might well be bewildered by the mass of material which the writer puts before his readers.

The book is divided into two parts—the first, practical; the second,

theoretical. In the former the author deals with the uses and abuses of psychology, the scope of pastoral psychology and its application to visitation and preaching. He rightly insists that the primary value of psychology for the pastor is that it helps him to realize that, first and foremost, he must seek to become an understanding person—understanding not only the members of his flock but himself also. He points out that it is easy for pastoral work in general, and preaching in particular, to be an escape from reality. "To preach to others," he writes, "provides us with unique opportunities for running away from ourselves." In this part of the book, Mr Guntrip is largely concerned to explain the psychological significance of anxiety; and he has a valuable analysis of what he describes as the "social and cultural sources of anxiety."

In the second half of the book the author plunges into the depths of Freudian and Jungian psychology. He seeks to separate the precious from the vile as he threads his way through this dense undergrowth. It is here that the beginner will find it difficult at times to follow him. He tackles the difficult problems which arise in connexion with conscience and the place of authority in the life of the soul. He seeks to distinguish between the former, rightly understood, and the super-ego of Freud, and, nothing daunted, he essays in a few pages to solve the problem of authority and freedom. In his reaction against a morbid authoritarianism, it may be doubted if he has given due place to a genuine authority. It is hardly enough to speak of the "authority of truth" and leave it at that.

Taken as a whole, however, the book represents a careful and balanced survey of the subject.

Bishops' College,
Cheshunt.

Lindsay Dewar.

Religion Through Drama. Edited by Michael Sims-Williams. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

In the introduction to this book, it is said that "an R.T.D. production is more nearly related to the charade than to the work of a dramatist." In the following sentence we are told that though the play should "aim at being a work of art, it is as an educational project that the method should be judged." And as an educational project the method seems admirable.

Mr Sims-Williams acknowledges that the effect on the audience is not his main concern. Yet in introducing the course on "How we got the Creeds" he rightly remarks: "The audience does not know who the characters are or why they are present unless they are told," and later refers to putting over the play sequence on the stage. These statements imply the technique of the theatre.

The fault seems to lie in the title of the book. This most desirable method of illuminating and vitalizing the Scriptures, and other subjects of common interest to all Christians, is one which belongs to the schoolroom rather than the theatre. The frank reference to the

charade is correct. It is the title "Religion through Drama" that implies a closer connexion with the art of the theatre than is justified.

There can be no doubt that the actor is educated by what he is doing. There can be no doubt that the audience is receiving much valuable information. There is, however, considerable doubt about the wisdom of implying a connexion with the work of a dramatist. For the real work of the true dramatist is to lift the audience to an experience beyond analysis, that they may share in the moment of life which is being presented on the stage.

"Un coin de la Nature vu à travers un temperament" was Zola's definition of true art. This is something which cannot be achieved by a method predominantly intellectual and informative.

One would not wish to depreciate so lively and original a technique as an educational method. A very similar approach to self-expression has been proved by the Iona community to have even therapeutic value for the sufferer from self-consciousness.

One may, however, deplore the title of a book that might be much more truly described as "Education through Charades."

SHEFFIELD. PAMELA KEILY.

THE STORY OF THE R.P.A. By A. Gowans Whyte. Watts. 5s.
THE CRADLE OF GOD. By Llewelyn Powys. Watts. 8s. 6d.

(A puzzle: interpret the following sentence: "The A.P.R. is the best A.R.P. against the R.P.A.")

The history of the Rationalist Press Association since its foundation fifty years ago cannot be said to make exciting reading. We are bound to admire the exemplary devotion and religious zeal of its pioneers. And in the history of publishing the R.P.A. has set some enterprising fashions. But the story turns out to be little but a string of names and statistics; the style is pedestrian (like that of George Jacob Holyoake, from whom an urbane and banal quotation is given on p. 33); and the general atmosphere that of a nineteenth-century study unventilated by the winds of twentieth-century logic, imagination, or political experience. Mr Whyte writes with commendable moderation. But the impossibility of achieving a really satisfactory definition of what is meant (or meant to be meant) by the word "rationalism" (see pp. 36 f.) is perhaps a symbol of the impossibility of his task.

The reissue by the same publishers of an old book by the late Llewelyn Powys will not, we fear, do Mr Powys' memory any good. Llewelyn was, we think history will show, the least distinguished of three distinguished brothers (of whom T. F. alone achieves real stature). And an imaginative picture of the history of Judæo-Christianity, in best destructive vein, was a subject least suited to his slight but very real talent.

M. J. K., C.R.

THE REALITY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By Henry Bett. Hodder and Stoughton. 9s. 6d.

This book claims, according to the publishers' blurb, to "meet fairly and squarely *on its own ground* [my italics] the modern pseudo-scientific scepticism which seeks to confute the Christian faith in miracle. . . ." If the book had done this it would have been an important work: there is no more urgent or difficult job for the Christian apologist than to start his argument from the characteristic assumptions and experiences of the modern world and show where these imply some further unacknowledged reality and where they fall into contradiction. Unfortunately Dr Bett does not appear to be equipped for the job, for he does not show any appreciation of the strength of the scientist's case or the common-sense quality that it possesses for our age. What is more surprising is that a Doctor of Letters should permit himself to write such a phrase as "there is absolutely no real reason whatever."

EXETER. K. G. COLLIER.

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